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1 INTRODUCTION 
The need for people to protect themselves and their assets is as old as humankind. People’s 
physical safety and their possessions have always been at risk from deliberate attack or accidental 
damage. The advance of information and communication technology (ICT) means that many 
individuals, as well as corporations, have additional ranges of physical (equipment) and electronic 
(data) assets that are at risk. Furthermore, the increased number and types of interactions in 
cyberspace have enabled new forms of attack on people and their possessions. Consider 
grooming of minors in chat-rooms, or Nigerian email cons: minors were targeted by paedophiles 
before the creation of chatrooms, and Nigerian criminals sent the same letters by physical mail or 
fax before there was email. But the technology has decreased the cost of many types of attacks, or 
the degree of risk for the attackers.  
At the same time, cyberspace is still new to many people, which means they do not understand 
these risks or recognize the signs of an attack as readily as they might in the physical world. The 
ICT industry has developed a plethora of security mechanisms, which could be used to mitigate 
risks or make attacks significantly more difficult. Currently, many people are either not aware of 
these mechanisms, or are unable or unwilling to use them. Security experts have taken to 
portraying people as ‘the weakest link’ in their efforts to deploy effective security (for example, 
Schneier (2000)). However, recent research has revealed that at least some of the problem may 
be that security mechanisms are hard to use or are ineffective. This paper summarizes current 
research on the usability of security mechanisms and discusses options for increasing this usability 
and the effectiveness of these mechanisms. 
Most security mechanisms are based on access control and checking of credentials, and often 
users are told ‘not to trust anyone in cyberspace’. Most people would agree that minors in chat-
rooms should not unquestioningly trust that their conversation partners are who they say they are, 
and that recipients of con mails should not believe the stories put forward as lures. But the solution 
to the threats from cyberspace cannot simply be ‘don’t trust anyone’. Trust is an integral part of our 
social and business interactions: trust that is warranted will, over time, lead to an increase in social 
capital and a decrease in the cost of economic systems. The review in this paper points out the 
underlying dilemma between the need for trust in human interactions and the dangers of 
misplacing trust in the electronic domain. Finally, this paper identifies some usability issues 
connected to privacy, which is closely linked to security and trust. 
2 USABILITY 
Usability of security mechanisms was, until recently, an under-researched area. Zurko and Simon 
(1996) were the first to point out that current security mechanisms make unreasonable demands 
on many stakeholders. Users, system administrators and system developers struggle with the 
workload created by many current security mechanisms, and are overwhelmed by the increasing 
complexity involved in securing systems at all possible levels (hardware, operating system, 
network, applications). The problems of system administrators and developers will be briefly 
considered in the conclusions to this section. The main part of the paper, however, focuses on 
usability of security mechanisms for users. 
The definition of a usable system (based on Shackel 1975) requires that 
•  the intended users can meet a desired level of performance operating it (task performance); 
•  the amount of learning/practice required to reach that desired level of performance is Usability and trust in information systems        Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention Project 
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appropriate (learnability); 
•  the system does not place any undue physical or mental strain on the user (user cost); and 
•  users are satisfied with the experience of interacting with the system. 
 
These considerations have traditionally been applied to an individual user interacting with the 
technology. However, most interactions between users and security mechanisms take place in the 
context of a socio-technical system (for example, a corporate environment) with different 
stakeholders (Checkland 1999). These stakeholders have different goals and views, which 
sometimes conflict – for example, the organization may put the task performance of the 
organization as a whole before satisfaction of the individual user. While outside the corporate 
context, users may have some degree of choice about security mechanisms and whether they 
employ them, organizations set security policies, which not only govern the selection of security 
mechanisms, but also specify the behaviour that users are expected to exhibit. Another issue is 
that key usability principles (for example, providing feedback or forgiveness) are currently not 
applied to design of security mechanisms, because help offered to the user could also be exploited 
by a potential attacker. Usability and security are often seen as competing design goals and it is 
thus not surprising that the results of the few empirical studies that have looked at usability of 
security mechanisms have been rather damning. Security mechanisms that have been studied 
include authentication mechanisms, email encryption and web security; the remainder of this 
section summarizes the findings and discusses how usability of these specific mechanisms could 
be improved. 
2.1 Authentication Mechanisms 
Authentication is a cornerstone of most security systems today, and most users interact with these 
mechanisms on a daily basis. The login is usually a two-step procedure: 
1.  identification (entering the user_id or account), followed by  
2.  verification (matching the password stored for that account to what the user enters).  
 
Some mechanisms can operate as a one-step procedure of identification or verification only. 
There are three types of authentication mechanisms: 
3.  knowledge-based authentication (passwords and passphrases, PINs, graphical passwords); 
4.  token-based authentication (physical tokens such as smartcards or badges); and 
5.  biometric-based authentication (using users’ physical characteristics such as fingerprint, hand 
geometry, iris pattern or face). 
 
Some security mechanisms may combine two of these mechanisms as part of the two-step 
procedure (for example, bank card and PIN).  
The vast majority of empirical studies on usability and security have looked at authentication 
mechanisms. This review uses those findings to ground a detailed discussion of the causes of 
usability problems with security mechanisms and what options are available for improving that 
situation. 
2.1.1 Knowledge-based authentication  
Knowledge-based authentication is by far the most common security mechanism used in ICT 
today. The cardinal rule of knowledge-based authentication is that the verification item (password 
or PIN) should exist in two places only: in the system (in encrypted form) and in the user’s mind, 
and should not be externalized (written down) or disclosed to anyone else. Usability and trust in information systems        Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention Project 
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Passwords and passphrases. Passwords consist of strings of alphanumeric characters. To prevent 
cracking attacks,
1 security experts advise that users must have strong passwords (a non-
meaningful string of characters drawn from a large character set, mixing letters, numbers and 
symbols, and upper and lower case) and many company security policies (see also section on user 
interfaces) mandate the use of strong passwords. Unfortunately, the functioning of human memory 
makes strong passwords more difficult to recall. In the study by Adams and Sasse (1999), users 
reported that they had an increasing number of passwords to remember and regularly encountered 
problems, particularly for infrequently used passwords.  
Sasse et al. (2001) confirmed this with a set of objective data on password performance and 
concluded that the way in which passwords are currently implemented (non-meaningful items, 
changed regularly, with many similar competing items) conflicts with the characteristics of human 
memory (items decay over time unless recalled frequently, cannot forget on demand, similar items 
compete), especially for infrequently used passwords. 
Brostoff and Sasse (2000) provide some insight into failed logins based on empirical data. 
•  52 per cent of failed logins are due to users entering the wrong password (37 per cent 
entered their old password for the same system, instead of their current one, 15 per cent 
entered their password for another system). 
•  In 12 per cent of failed logins users seemed to have recalled the correct password, but 
mistyped it on entry.  
•  20 per cent of failed logins were due to the users entering the wrong user_id (account name), 
rather than the wrong password. 
 
Users’ inability to cope with the current number and form of passwords is further confirmed by the 
quality of passwords users chose. In a survey of 1,200 users of bank access control systems 
(Petrie 2002): 
•  90 per cent of respondents reported having passwords that were dictionary words or names, 
with  
•  47 per cent of the sample using a name (their own name or names of their partners, children 
or pets); and 
•  only nine per cent of respondents reported using cryptographically strong passwords, as 
recommended by security policies. 
 
Yan (2001) points out that weak passwords, as used by 90 per cent of respondents in this study, 
hugely reduce the time and computing power required to crack passwords. 
Even in organizations that explicitly instruct users on how to select strong passwords, many do not 
comply: Yan et al. (2000) report that 32 per cent of students at Cambridge University had 
passwords that could be cracked with a quick dictionary attack. Dhamija and Perrig (2000) report 
that despite instruction and admitting to ‘knowing better’, participants in their study at the University 
of California at Berkeley picked weak passwords.
2 Similar results have been reported by studies 
run in corporate environments, for example, Sasse et al. (2001). Other pertinent findings on 
password quality from this study are that: 
•  most users try to increase the memorability of passwords by using one password for several 
systems;  
•  more than half of passwords consist of a word with a number at the end;  
•  users only change passwords when forced to; and 
•  most ‘change’ the password by increasing the number by one. 
 
Personal identification numbers (PINs). PINs are used to secure access to applications, either in 
combination with a token for two-step identification (for example, for cash dispensers), or as a one-
step authentication (for example, mobile phones, home burglar alarms). Given their wide usage, 
the lack of available (published) empirical evidence is disconcerting; many financial institutions 
conduct internal research, but the findings are never published for fear of damaging customer 
confidence or reputation. There are informally reported numbers, for instance, that one-third of 
users use their birth date as their PIN (Anderson 2001). There are anecdotal reports that users 
write the PIN on the card itself, or other materials carried in the same wallet; some banks have also 
discovered PINs scratched into cash dispensers or materials surrounding them.  
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which also tallies with results from general research on human memory (Schacter 2002). Sasse et 
al. (2001), comparing problems reported with passwords and PINs in the same corporate 
environment, conclude that: 
1.  infrequently used PINs are extremely vulnerable to being forgotten;  
2.  even frequently (daily) used PINs are forgotten by the majority of users after very short periods 
(one week) of non-use; and 
3.  managing multiple PINs, and/or PINs that are frequently changed, creates even more usability 
problems than managing multiple passwords. 
 
Graphical passwords. Increasing problems with passwords and PINs have led to a spurt in the 
efforts to provide more usable knowledge-based authentication mechanisms. Psychological 
research on human memory (Schacter 2002) has established that: 
1.  human performance at recognition is far superior to unaided recall, and  
2.  images are processed and stored differently from words, and are easier to recall. 
 
This knowledge has been applied to the design of graphical user interfaces (GUI) for 20 years now, 
and more recently has been applied to developing graphical passwords, which authenticate users 
through recognition of images, or features of images. The two leading examples of such systems 
are Déjà Vu (Dhamija and Perrig 2000) and Passfaces™ (Passfaces 2003). With Déjà Vu, users 
select their clues from a set of random art (randomly generated computer art) and, on login, select 
their images from a set of distractor images. Passfaces™ is based on a large image base of 
human faces.
3 Users select one face from each of four panels of nine faces and recognize these 
images from eight distractor faces on login. 
Initial evaluation of these systems indicated huge advantages in memory performance compared 
to standard passwords. Dhamija and Perrig (2000) report that an initial evaluation of Déjà Vu 
demonstrated much better performance than for passwords. A laboratory-based study of 
Passfaces™ (Valentine 1999a,b) found extremely good recall rates (over 95 per cent successful 
logins within three attempts), even after a three-month period of non-use.  
These results indicate that graphical password systems have a significant performance advantage 
for infrequently used authentication. Informal reports from commercial trials, however, indicate that 
this performance advantage disappears rapidly when users have multiple logins using the same 
type of image or when the images/faces are changed. 
Graphical passwords are not suitable for frequently used authentication because they tend to be 
slow – graphics slow down the login procedure – and to decrease the chances of an attacker 
guessing the right cue – users have to go through a minimum of three or four rounds of selection. 
Brostoff and Sasse (2000) report that logins by students to a coursework server dropped by 70 per 
cent compared to the standard password login, because the graphical login took 30 to 90 seconds 
to complete, as opposed to five seconds for the password login. Also, frequent use of graphical 
passwords in public or semi-public environments (such as public libraries or Internet cafes) 
increases the chances of shoulder-surfing attackers. 
Empirical evidence on knowledge-based authentication. Knowledge-based authentication in the 
form of passwords and PINs is by far the most widely used security mechanism today. From a 
technical point of view, password systems are cheap to set up. However, empirical research has 
shown that the cost of operating this mechanism is unacceptable for individual users and 
organizations alike. 
1.  The user cost associated with current password systems is unacceptable for most individual 
users. There is a high mental workload associated with memorizing and recalling multiple 
passwords, and cost associated with failed logins. Additional user cost arises because many 
users worry about not being able to recall passwords, which leads to stress and this, in turn, 
often creates negative perceptions of, and attitudes to, security mechanisms and organizational 
security in general (Adams and Sasse 1999). 
2.  When legitimate users fail to authenticate, they are unable to carry out the work activity or gain 
access to resources or services. Thus, low task-performance on the login task impacts on 
performance of the production task. This means individual users are prevented from reaching 
their goals, which is irritating at best, and very distressing if the goal is important and/or users 
are under time pressures. In corporate environments, failure to complete production tasks has Usability and trust in information systems        Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention Project 
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a negative impact on the productivity of the overall organization. 
3.  There are further costs to the individual user and the organization when passwords have to be 
re-set following a failed login. The user has to construct, memorize and recall a new password. 
The organization incurs further costs because the re-setting of passwords has to be done by 
system administrators or via specialist helpdesks; some organizations now expend significant 
resources on re-setting passwords (Sasse et al. 2001). Many organizations use automated 
password reminder systems, which minimize the costs for both the individual user and the 
organizations, but re-issuing rather than re-setting passwords contravenes standard security 
guidelines (FIPS 1985). Automated credential recovery systems (CRS) can be used to re-set 
passwords without a human operator (Just 2003), but the cost of setting up a secure CRS, and 
registering credentials, is high for both organization and user.
4 
 
The attitude of many security experts is that good security does not come cheap. The results from 
empirical research on knowledge-based authentication show, however, that the strategies that 
users employ to cope with the ‘inhuman’ workload that knowledge-based authentication creates 
makes these systems largely ineffective. The vast majority of users do write some or all of their 
passwords down – and some security departments even encourage their users to do so in a 
secure manner.
5  
Another, less often discussed, threat arises from users’ attempts to increase memorability by using 
the same password across several systems. Whilst the increase in risk from doing this may be low 
in many corporate contexts (where re-use of passwords may be allowed for low-risk systems), 
Anderson (2001, p. 39) points out that many users do not consider the consequences in every 
circumstance: “the password you use to authenticate [yourself as] the customer of the electronic 
banking system … is quite possibly known to a Mafia-operated porn site as well”. 
Similarly, users may see little wrong with disclosing the PIN used on a shared office or mobile 
phone. But if this is the same PIN as used with their bankcard, this practice greatly facilitates theft 
by colleagues or family members. Given that individuals who are victims of bank fraud are very 
likely to have been defrauded by somebody known to them, the need for individuals to protect 
themselves on shared devices, such as home PCs and mobile phones, is overriding.
6 
Any knowledge-based authentication mechanism will create a certain amount of mental workload 
for individual users, but the workload is manageable if the number of items is kept low, or if items 
are frequently used (in which case recall becomes automatic). The problems observed arise from 
the fact that each user interacts with many systems and devices that have to be protected, and 
their numbers are likely to increase significantly over the next 10 years.  
Research on memory (see Schacter (2002) for a summary) suggests that recalling more than two 
or three strong passwords is beyond the ability of human memory, and even those would be 
difficult to recall if used infrequently. Possible interventions include: 
1.  Reducing the number of passwords. In corporate environments, a deliberate strategy to reduce 
the numbers of passwords and PINs is employed. Some companies are deploying single sign-
on, for an example, see V-Go (2003). Even simple measures such as standardizing individual 
users’ user_id across different systems can help to reduce users’ mental workload and 
numbers of failed logins.  
2.  Provide training and support. If security needs are such that users have to manage a number 
of strong passwords, specialist instruction and training on how to construct and memorize 
passwords, for example, on how to construct passwords or passphrases with a high degree of 
personal entropy (Ellison et al. 2000), can improve their performance. Passphrase (longer, and 
hence harder to crack) passwords allow users to use meaningful content (Schneier 2000). This 
increases memorability, but also the chance of mistyping; given an appropriate number of 
attempts (see below), passphrases would seem particularly suitable for infrequently used 
authentication. Other types of support could be allowing users to store hints with a high degree 
of personal entropy (including images and sounds) in a CRS or personal password manager on 
a device users carry with them (for example, a personal digital assistant (PDA) or mobile 
phone). 
3.  Recognition rather than recall. The characteristics of human memory mean it is far easier to 
recognize an item (aided recall) or action than to recall it (unaided recall). This design principle 
is pervasive in the design of current-generation GUIs (where users recognize the correct 
command from a limited set of menu items or icons), and there have been attempts to apply Usability and trust in information systems        Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention Project 
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this principle to authentication mechanisms using graphical passwords. Such mechanisms are 
likely to work particularly well for infrequently used systems, provided the number of clues used 
is low, or multiple cues are very distinct. The principle can also be applied to text-based 
knowledge-based systems: for example, through associative passwords (see Zviran and Haga 
(1993)) or challenge-response authentication. 
4.  Move away from ‘all-or-nothing’ authentication. Current password logins fail unless the 
password is entered 100 per cent correctly, for instance, they are not forgiving to user error. 
Rather than drawing a complete blank, most logins fail because users mis-type passwords, or 
enter an old password, or the password for a different system. A key usability principle is to 
provide feedback to users when their actions are unsuccessful. Current password systems do 
not provide any feedback about why the login failed and possible actions the user could take to 
recover, because this could help the attacker. Nevertheless, authentication mechanisms can be 
made more forgiving. Text-based challenge-response systems, for instance, can be set to pass 
the user on three correct answers, or four correct and one incorrect, etc. Multi-level 
authentication (Zviran and Haga 1990) can make systems more forgiving by providing backup 
when access by password and/or PIN (see below) fails; typically, the user will be taken through 
an automated or human-interaction credential recovery process. This method is widely used in 
telephone banking, for instance, but many of these systems are vulnerable because they use 
publicly available knowledge (for example, mother’s maiden name) as credentials, as opposed 
to ‘secrets’ (Schneier 2000).
7 Even the usability of standard password authentication can be 
improved by relaxing some policies. Brostoff and Sasse (2003) conducted a three-month trial in 
which users were free to have as many login attempts as they wanted and they could at any 
stage ask for a password reminder. They found that, when the initial login attempt failed, only 
53 per cent of users managed to recover within three attempts, but almost all users (93 per 
cent) would persist and manage to login in 10 attempts or less. Increasing the number of login 
attempts increases the threat of password guessing by a fellow insider (who may also employ 
shoulder-surfing), but makes no difference to the threat of password cracking by an outside 
attacker (which is what most firms worry about). 
 
In the light of usability problems with PINs, it is worrying that manufacturers of smartcards and 
other forms of token-based authentication systems seem to favour using tokens in combination 
with a PIN, and that PINs have been proposed as a backup for biometric. 
2.1.2 Token-based authentication 
Whilst knowledge-based authentication is currently the predominant mechanism, token-based 
authentication has been widely used in the physical domain. Tokens can be used as a one-step 
process, for example, swipe cards for door access, but this is a fairly weak mechanism since a 
token may be stolen or found by a potential attacker, who can use it until the loss/theft is 
discovered and the token is revoked. Therefore, tokens are more often combined with another 
method in a two-step process, the combination of bank cards and PINs for cash dispensers being 
the most widely used example. Tokens are becoming increasingly popular, with the token used for 
authentication, and the knowledge-based item (PIN) for verification, thus reducing the memory load 
compared to a two-step knowledge-based procedure. There is no published research on usability 
issues with tokens or smartcards. Tokens such as the SecurID have been used, with apparent 
success, for remote access by financial institutions. On the other hand, the high cost of replacing 
lost tokens and/or lost working time has led companies in other sectors to abandon it. 
The city of Turin is currently undertaking the first large-scale attempt to issue smartcards to citizens 
for access to services and payment of local taxes (Torinofacile 2003). Based on 2,655 smartcards 
issued, the number of tokens that were lost in the post/stolen in the first six months was low (16). 
The majority of citizens who registered for the card were male, well educated and aged between 
19 and 45; the number of cards issued to males was three times higher than for female citizens. 
Since most home and small business PCs are currently not fitted with smartcard readers, the trial 
issued digital certificates for users who needed them. The initial phase has seen a high number of 
calls to the helpdesk, the majority of which (83) were due to problems with using these digital 
certificates. The second most frequent problem was that personal details registered about the 
owners of the cards were incorrect.
8 These insights offer some pointers as to logistical aspects and 
the costs that are likely to be associated with issuing such tokens to a large number of citizens. At 
the same time, small businesses, single traders and professionals report significant time savings 
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restricted to office hours.  
Smartcards can offer additional usability benefits: once the login procedure is completed, the token 
can be used to carry sessions from one machine to another, thus removing the need to log out or 
lock the screen when leaving the machine unattended for brief periods. They can also offer 
additional security features for applications such as credit cards.  
One usability concern arising from the increasing popularity of tokens is that users may end up 
being ‘weighed down’ by a collection of tokens that they find hard to manage. There are two 
possible ways in which this might be prevented: 
1.  Single tokens carrying multiple credentials. A single token, such as a smartcard, could be used 
to store users’ credentials for multiple systems. The single token could either store data for 
multiple identification and verification mechanisms operated by different organizations 
(providing the user with a personal ‘credential/password manager’), or have a single strong 
verification (providing the user with a ‘magic key’). Both approaches would require an open 
standard for credentials, and the second would also require agreement on a single form of 
authentication and a high degree of trust between participating organizations. The ‘magic key’ 
model would create least work for the user, but also create a single point of attack. 
2.  Miniaturization of tokens. Organizations continue to issue their own tokens and decide their 
own access control mechanisms, but the tokens are so small (for example, RFID chips) that 
users can keep all of their tokens on them at all times, for example, in a smartcard-type device 
to which individual chips can be added. 
2.1.3 Biometric authentication 
Biometric authentication uses a physical characteristic (the most commonly used ones being a 
fingerprint, iris recognition, hand geometry and face recognition) to identify or verify individuals. 
Since biometrics use physical characteristics, they are generally perceived to provide a strong form 
of identification or authentication. However, many usability experts (for example, Schneier (2000)) 
dismiss biometrics as an ineffective security mechanism because, unlike knowledge-based items, 
biometrics are not secret: systems can be attacked by harvesting characteristics from legitimate 
users (for example, ‘lifting’ a fingerprint from a surface or taking a picture of the eye). As a 
heuristic, the better that systems protect against such attacks, the more expensive they are. 
Most biometric solutions are designed to operate in the traditional two-step mode: the user 
identifies herself with using a token or user_id, and then presents her biometric characteristic, 
which is compared to a previously stored template: access to cash dispensers, for instance, could 
be secured with a card and fingerprint. Templates are reduced versions of the biometric 
characteristic, mapping a certain number of key data points. As a rule of thumb, the more data 
points a template has, the more accurate the recognition, and the more expensive the application 
is to procure and run. Accuracy of identification has implications for both usability and security: lack 
of accuracy leads to false rejection (keeping legitimate users out, which reduces usability) or false 
acceptance (letting in an unauthorized user, or mistaking one user for another), which reduces 
security. For any particular application with given levels of accuracy, the operators have to make a 
trade-off: minimizing the number of false acceptances made by the application will lead to a higher 
number of false rejections. Effectively, operators have to make a trade-off between usability and 
security. Schneier (2003) cites a study that estimates that even a false rejection rate of one per 
cent could increase the average throughput time for each passenger through airport security by 45 
minutes. 
An assumed usability advantage of biometrics is that, since individuals always carry their 
characteristics with them, there is no token that users can forget, lose or have stolen and this 
therefore minimizes the memory load on the user and supports the usability principle of universal 
access (Fairhurst et al. 2002). The reality is that biometric security solutions raise a raft of usability 
issues, for individuals and organizations alike. A significant number of users are temporarily or 
permanently unable to register a particular biometric. For instance, five per cent of people are 
estimated not to have readable fingerprints,
10 and blind users cannot register iris images. 
Temporary inability to register or use a biometric can result from cuts or burns on fingers for 
fingerprints, or pregnancy or certain types of medication for iris recognition. While temporary 
inability to use a biometric application might lead to mere delays (decrease in task performance) or 
annoyance (decrease in user satisfaction), permanent inability to use the system would violate the 
principle of universal access. Since exclusion of certain user groups is not feasible or acceptable Usability and trust in information systems        Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention Project 
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for a wide range of applications, operators have to provide a contingency authentication system 
(for example, a PIN, though this is likely to cause problems, or staff checking written credentials). 
The cost of operating a contingency authentication system can increase the cost of the biometric 
application significantly. 
More than any other security mechanism, biometric authentication raises the question of 
acceptability. For certain reasons, some user groups are not comfortable with the use of 
biometrics, or with the use of biometric authentication in general, for example: 
1.  Religious reasons. Some religions prevent their members from having their face or eyes 
photographed, others prohibit touching of artifacts that have been touched by a member of the 
opposite gender. 
2.  Safety concerns. Some people fear they might be maimed or killed by criminals trying to obtain 
their biometric. This seems to be particularly prevalent in individuals who have had no personal 
experience with biometrics (BIOVISION 2003), since for these individuals, the perception of 
biometrics is fed by depictions in films (for example, of removing eyeballs or hands to overcome 
biometric access control systems in Minority Report or Die Another Day). 
3.  Privacy concerns. Some biometrics, such as face recognition, can also be used in a one-step 
identification process. An issue here is that they can be used covertly (without the individual 
being aware that she is being identified), for example, in combination with security cameras, to 
detect known shoplifters, football hooligans, etc. A key concern for many users is whether their 
biometric data are ‘safe’. This concern can be de-composed into two questions:  
(i)   How safe is my biometric data? The concern is whether data can be copied or changed. 
(ii)  How is my biometric data used? The concern is whether the operator, or anyone else, can 
use the data for purposes other than those advertized, for example, for tracking users’ 
movements. 
Users weigh these concerns against benefits to themselves and others. 
4.  Labour relations. In corporate environments, biometric authentication is often used as a means 
of exerting control over employee behaviour – for example, biometrics on a time and 
attendance monitoring system prevent ‘buddy-punching’. Employees have fewer issues with 
the system provided it works well enough, and they trust the operator of the system (usually 
their employer) (BIOVISION 2003). However, most people dislike the idea of being constantly 
monitored and tightly controlled, which is a particular concern with fine-grained monitoring of 
behavioural biometrics (for example, monitoring keystrokes on a keyboard) (Henderson et al. 
1998). Constant worry about not performing, or how behaviour is being interpreted by the 
‘watchers’, can be a significant source of stress. 
 
These concerns will need to be balanced by significant real and perceived benefits to make the 
technology useful and acceptable. Data from surveys and interviews with individuals and 
organizations reviewed in the EU Roadmap Project on Biometrics (BIOVISION 2003), indicate that 
this balance will be hard to achieve for large-scale public security deployments of biometrics. The 
performance that can be achieved with current systems is not sufficient, the cost of deployment 
and operation is high and most users currently have no security needs that are addressed by these 
systems. The perceived benefits are seen as being for ‘government’, with the ‘citizen user’ 
shouldering the cost in terms of use and increased cost of identification documents. 
In marked contrast, acceptability of biometric solutions was high for applications in areas with a 
perceived security need (such as access control for neo-natal wards in hospitals) or if users 
experienced a reduction in physical or mental workload (such as fingerprint logins replacing 
multiple passwords and PINs). In general, acceptability of biometric solutions is higher amongst 
those with first-hand experience of biometric applications or those that have a relative or friend who 
has such experience. 
BIOVISION (2003) identified many commercial applications of biometrics that are likely to succeed. 
Some of these applications will be in areas with high security needs, where performance with a 
limited number of registered users can be achieved at acceptable cost. Most manufacturers focus 
on the financial sector and fraud reduction as the most likely application areas (Coventry et al. 
2003). The Director of US National Biometric Test Center, James Wayman, suggested as early as 
1998 that “The technology now exists to replace pass codes [PINs] with biometric measures 
without a substantive decrease in security protection” (Wayman 1998). 
However, many banks have ruled out use of biometrics on cash dispensers in the foreseeable Usability and trust in information systems        Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention Project 
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future, partly because of concerns about how customers will respond to false rejection,
11 and partly 
because the cost of the technology is too high. In the UK, the Nationwide Building Society has 
investigated the potential costs and benefits of biometric applications over a number of years. 
Trials with fingerprints and iris recognition showed good usability
12 and user acceptance, but the 
increased cost of cash dispensers (25 per cent) does not make the widespread introduction of 
such systems viable (McClue 2003). A German study also raised the additional cost of the secure 
registration process (which has to be performed by trained and trustworthy staff), and the technical 
and organizational measures required to safeguard customers’ biometric templates as key reasons 
against use of biometric authentication. The same study also concluded that reliability of biometrics 
was such that customers would have to be issued with a PIN as a backup (Thiel 2001), which is 
likely to lead to significant usability problems. The entertainment industry employs biometrics for 
convenient verification (as opposed to strong identification): Disney registers hand geometry with 
season tickets to stop travel agents misusing season tickets for tour groups, and lap dancing clubs 
register fingerprints with credit cards on entry and request that customers confirm each order 
(which will appear on their bill) with a fingerprint. 
These developments indicate that, even though biometrics is generally perceived as a security 
technology, it may be more likely to succeed in areas where it enables business process 
improvement, leading to improved productivity of services or cost reduction. An example is the use 
of dynamic signature recognition (DSR), which authenticates users based on the shape of their 
signature and characteristics of their signing pattern. In contrast to most other biometrics, providing 
a dynamic signature is also a declaration of will in the legal sense (BIOVISON 2003). DSR means 
contracts can be kept in electronic form, thus allowing companies to finally enter the long-promised 
age of the paperless office. The Nationwide Building Society, for instance, is deploying DSR in its 
branches and aims to store all mortgage agreements in electronic form only, and forecasts 
significant cost savings (BBC 2002). 
2.2 Summary: Authentication Mechanisms 
Passwords and PINs were first introduced when computers were expensive and scarce, and 
anyone attempting unauthorized access had to have physical access to a machine. With the 
exception of a few professionals, such as systems administrators, each user only had a few items 
to recall. The arrival of networking technology has increased the number of attacks and attackers 
that each system faces, and the proliferation of devices that have to be protected means that each 
user has to manage a multitude of knowledge-based items. In this context, knowledge-based 
authentication in the form of passwords and PINs as the general authentication mechanism has 
become unusable, both from an individual user’s and an organization’s point of view. 
At the same time, as this paper points out, there are a number of usability issues with other 
authentication mechanisms, and – given that most of these are relatively new and largely untried – 
further issues are bound to emerge with more extensive use. To anticipate usability issues, we 
have to consider not only the immediate task of using the security mechanism, but also the 
question of universal access. Knowledge-based authentication inconveniences many users, but 
presents an insurmountable access hurdle for only a relatively small number of elderly users and 
some users with learning difficulties. These user groups would have even bigger problems with 
token-based authentication, which requires them to look after the token, plus usually to have more 
technical skills. Biometric identification has potentially the lowest mental workload, but any specific 
biometric technique bars some users because they cannot register the biometrics – in the case of 
fingerprint, favoured by many politicians because of its success in the context of law enforcement, 
the number is around five per cent. Authentication of multiple characteristics would solve this 
problem, but is currently prohibitively expensive; the development of smart cameras, which can 
capture and process a range of biometric characteristics, would make it feasible. 
To conclude that because fingerprint matching works in a law enforcement context it will work for 
biometric authentication, is misguided: the techniques employed and context of operation are very 
different.
13 The general public is as unaware of these subtle differences as are many politicians – 
many find fingerprinting unacceptable precisely because ‘it is something you do to criminals’. More 
than any other mechanism, biometrics face acceptability issues, not only because of such 
misconceptions and Hollywood depictions, but also because individuals have to place a great deal 
of trust in the operator of the technology to safeguard their biometric templates and their privacy. If 
biometric templates are compromised, the consequences for individuals can be severe, particular if Usability and trust in information systems        Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention Project 
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one characteristic is used in a variety of applications. Biometric authentication can afford invasions 
of privacy if technology is set up to collect data beyond the immediate purpose of authentication – 
for example, to determine who goes where, when, and in the company of whom. BIOVISION 
(2003) reports that (particularly young and technically knowledgeable) users oppose the use of 
biometric characteristics on id_cards and passports because they perceive governments would 
most likely succumb to the temptation of ‘function creep’. 
Any of the alternative mechanisms will increase the cost of authentication, in some cases 
substantially, and the question is who will bear the cost. Individual customers are usually not 
inclined to pay more for better security. In corporate environments, the cost will be weighed against 
the losses (in tangible financial terms, and/or intangibles, such as reputation). This section has 
pointed out that application of biometrics, for instance, can be used for business process 
improvements that reduce cost. For a pure security application, a good cost-benefit ratio will be 
much harder to achieve. 
The answer to the question of which is the most usable authentication mechanism is that ‘it 
depends’ – on the characteristics of the user group, and the task, and the physical and social 
context in which users and the security mechanism interact. 
2.3 Security and Tasks 
The notion of task is key to considerations of usability in general, and performance in particular. 
Human behaviour is largely goal-driven, so the effective and efficient execution of tasks that help 
us attain goals is important. The discussion so far has shown that usability of knowledge-based 
authentication differs for frequently and infrequently performed tasks. In addition to minimizing the 
physical and mental workload for users, a well-designed mechanism needs to maximize 
effectiveness and efficiency of task execution. A mechanism must support the desired outcome, 
and it must be configured for efficient task execution. An example would be providing a hands-free 
access control mechanism on a door when there is a need to carry things, or the use of speaker 
recognition as a means of authentication in a system accessed by telephone. 
A further notion of key importance is the distinction between production tasks and supporting tasks. 
Security – like safety – is a supporting task, for instance, it is not on the critical path to attaining the 
goal. This means that performance in terms of efficiency is even more critical than for the 
production task, on which users are focused. If a supporting task conflicts with a production task, 
users will attempt to work around it or cut it out altogether. If a supporting task requires significant 
extra effort, and/or interferes with the production tasks (and this is often the case with security and 
safety measures), users need to understand the reason for this, and be motivated to comply. 
Failure to provide users with the necessary understanding, training and motivation will result in 
human error (Reason 1990). The current reality is that security is badly integrated with production 
tasks, and individual users are often left to make a choice between complying with security 
regulations or getting their job done – with predictable results. The conclusion is that the selection 
of a security mechanism and how it is configured cannot be left to security experts; rather, such 
decisions need to be made in the context of business processes and workflow (Brostoff and Sasse 
2001). 
2.3.1 User motivation 
Many users are not motivated to comply with security regulations. Beyond the conflicts with 
production tasks, Weirich and Sasse (2001) identified the following key factors in a survey on user 
motivation and security. 
1.  Users do not believe they are personally at risk. 
2.  Users do not believe they will be held accountable for not following security regulations. 
3.  The behaviour required by security mechanisms conflicts with social norms.
14  
4. The behaviour required by security mechanisms conflicts with users’ self image. The 
perception is that only ‘nerds’ and ‘paranoid’ people follow security regulations. 
 
There can be no doubt that security in general, and ICT security in particular, currently suffer from 
an image problem. Education campaigns (similar to those employed in health education) can be 
effective, provided they make users believe that they are at risk,
15 but good security behaviour also 
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(Fogg 2003) offers techniques for designing systems that intrigue, persuade and reward users for 
good security behaviour. 
2.3.2 Security policies and security culture 
At an organizational level, a key change that companies need to undertake is to integrate security 
into their business processes. This means that the habit of copying ‘standard’ security policies and 
mandating ‘maximum strength’ security irrespective of security needs, should be replaced by risk 
and threat analysis appropriate to the business. Many companies already do this, but as Schneier 
(2003) points out, the interests and needs of all stakeholders are rarely considered, and the 
economics of security are generally not well understood. 
Once security aims appropriate to the organization have been established, role models are 
essential to change behaviour and rebuild the security culture. This will require buy-in from the top 
(senior management often exhibit the worst security behaviour because they believe they are too 
important to bother with ‘petty’ security regulations), and making secure behaviour a desirable trait, 
for example, by making it part of professional and ethical norms (Sasse et al. 2001).  
Brostoff and Sasse (2001) point out that in many western countries, health and safety regulations 
have led to significant changes in organizational culture with respect to employee safety, and that 
Reason’s (1990) approach for designing safety as a socio-technical system offers a blueprint for a 
similar approach in the security domain. 
2.3.3 User interfaces to security tools and user-centred design 
Many security researchers and practitioners see usability of security as a user interface problem. 
The most widely known and cited paper on usability and security – ‘Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt’ 
(Whitten and Tygar 1999) – reports that a sample of users with a good level of technical knowledge 
failed to encrypt and decrypt their mail using PGP 5.0, even after receiving instruction and after 
practice. Whitten and Tygar attribute the problems they observed to a mismatch between users’ 
perception of the task of encrypting email, and the way that the pretty good privacy (PGP) interface 
presents those tasks to users. There can be no doubt that the security community has not paid 
much attention to usability until recently and, consequently, few tools have interfaces that fulfil 
usability criteria. Well-designed user interfaces can reduce users’ workload significantly: the AT&T 
Privacy Bird,
16 for example, alerts users when a site does not match their specified P3P (Platform 
for Privacy) preferences, which relieves users from inspecting the privacy policy of each site they 
interact with. 
User-centred design of security mechanisms, however, is more than user interface design. The 
case of PGP (Zimmermann 1995) presents a good example. The problem lies less with the 
interface to PGP than with the underlying concept of encryption (which pre-dates PGP), and how it 
functions. The concept of encryption is complex, and the terminology employed is fundamentally at 
odds with the everyday meaning of the terms: a cryptographic key does not function like a key in 
the physical world, and people’s understanding of ‘public’ and ‘private’ is different from how these 
terms are applied to public and private keys. While some security experts advocate educating all 
users on how encryption works so they can use it properly, this author argues that security 
systems should be designed to make it easy for users to do the right thing, with a minimum amount 
of effort and knowledge.  
There are examples showing that this is possible: statistics suggest that only 10 per cent of 
installed burglar alarms are armed when they should be, because they are too difficult to use. In 
the Channel 4 TV series, Better by Design, designers Richard Seymour and Dick Powell 
addressed the problem by applying the successful and well-understood car central locking 
mechanism to the house burglar alarm. The resulting alarm is extremely easy to operate (the 
system is armed and de-armed with a single key-press), and the device is light and visually 
appealing, so users can carry it on a keyring (Seymour Powell 2000). Another example of a step in 
the right direction is Friedman and Felten’s (2002) application of the user-centred approach for 
their Cookie-Watcher, which was designed to match users’ actual needs and values for privacy (as 
opposed to security experts’ prescriptions of how users should manage cookies). While users of 
the AT&T Privacy Bird still have to understand P3P in all its complexity to use it effectively, the 
Cookie-Watcher only presents users with the information they want, when they want it, and allows 
them to make decisions about whether to accept cookies. Given that most users’ perception of 
threats and risks is not accurate, user needs and preferences will need to be complemented by, Usability and trust in information systems        Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention Project 
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and reconciled with, output from an expert risk analysis. 
2.4 Trust 
In the past, interactions between strangers who never met face-to-face used to be rare events. 
Today, new technologies support an ever-increasing number of interactions between strangers: 
People who have never met ‘in real life’ buy and sell goods from each other on eBay, spend hours 
playing against each other on Xbox-live and date via instant messaging. These interactions involve 
different types and levels of risk and they are only possible if actors have trust in each other and in 
the systems they use to meet, communicate and transact. Yet, in many recent applications, this 
essential ingredient has proved difficult to attain: lack of trust in e-commerce applications, for 
instance, causes many people to stay away from these systems (Consumer WebWatch 2002). 
Since trust is a critical factor for user acceptance of cyber-systems and their long-term success, it 
has prompted a spate of research on human-computer interaction (HCI) and computer-meditated 
communications (CMC). Most of this research aims to help those designing or deploying such 
systems: the focus is on increasing users’ trust perceptions, rather than allowing users to make 
correct trust decisions. The recent surge of empirical studies on trust has also produced a large 
number of definitions and operationalizations of trust. Given that trust is an everyday term that 
applies in many different situations, this is not surprising. Several researchers have recognized the 
need for a trust framework and presented candidates. However, these models address only one 
type of trust-requiring on-line interaction (for example, e-commerce (Corritore et al. 2003; Egger 
2001; Riegelsberger and Sasse 2001)) or focus on trust as a psychological construct (McKnight 
and Chervany 2000). There is a need to unify these different perspectives on trust and – more 
importantly – to link them to structural dimensions that differentiate situations that require trust. The 
following provides a summary overview and discussion of the factors that have been identified. 
Trust is only required in situations characterized by risk and uncertainty. Only if something is at 
stake, and only if the outcome is uncertain, do we need to trust to engage in the situation. The 
simplest possible trust exchange involves only two actors – the trustor (the trusting actor) and the 
trustee (the trusted actor). Normally, both have something to gain by conducting the exchange – 
this might involve money, but also information, time or other goods that have value to the actors. 
Prior to the exchange, trustor and trustee have information about each other before they engage in 
the exchange. In interactions in cyberspace, many of these interactions are dis-embedded 
(Giddens 1990), since the actors are not in the same physical or time context. In e-commerce, for 
instance, the trustor may have to wait for days or week to take possession of the goods and check 
that they are to her satisfaction. Because of dis-embedding, interactions in cyberspace are riskier 
and require more trust than similar interactions in a physical context. In addition to having to trust 
the trustee, users have also to be prepared to trust the technology that mediates interaction (for 
example, the Internet) and their own ability to use both the underlying technology, and the specific 
application (for example, the e-commerce website) correctly. For the last two factors, usability is a 
key prerequisite. 
Whether users are prepared to trust and engage in an exchange, additionally depends on a 
number of other factors that characterize the interaction. Factors that have been identified 
include:
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1.  the number of actors involved in the exchange (ranging from dyads to potentially millions in 
public good dilemmas); 
2.  the actor type (individuals, organizations, technology such as an e-commerce web site); 
3.  whether there is synchronous or asynchronous trust exchange (asynchronous exchanges 
create higher strategic insecurity); 
4.  whether the user can identify trust-warranting properties; 
5.  the type of signals employed to communicate trustworthiness (symbols and symptoms of 
trustworthiness, identity and property signals); 
6.  the trustor’s propensity to trust; 
7.  the trustor’s knowledge of the situation; 
8.  the trustor’s prior experience; 
9.  the potential benefits expected by the trustor; and 
10. the risk to the trustor’s risks (enacted as ‘trusting action’). 
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Since the technology that mediates interactions in cyberspace is novel and complex for most 
users, their willingness to trust will be mostly influenced by previous experience with a particular 
trustee and situation (factors 2, 7, and 8) and assessment of the trust-warranting properties 
(factors 4 and 5). For interactions with low numbers of actors (for example, e-commerce 
transactions), it will, therefore, be important that users can reliably (i) identify the actors, for 
example, that it is easy to determine whether an email purporting to be from my bank is really from 
my bank, and (ii) identify and interpret the trust-warranting properties in an interaction: for example, 
are the hundreds of positive votes or reviews I see honest reviews from real customers. Currently, 
the technology makes it easy to fake identities and trust-warranting properties in cyberspace; 
consequently, the trust basis for interactions in cyberspace is rather fragile. 
2.5 Privacy 
Safeguarding privacy is a key concern for many users in cyberspace. On the one hand, security 
mechanisms can be an essential tool for protecting privacy, for example, because they prevent 
unauthorized access to data. On the other hand, a security technology can enable invasions of 
privacy, for example, because it becomes possible to monitor an individual’s behaviour closely, or 
track her movements. 
Much of the published literature on privacy concentrates on protecting certain types of data without 
establishing what people regard as private information (Davies 1997). Expert opinion on what is 
invasive is a necessary, but not sufficient basis for designing technology that is acceptable in use. 
Adams and Sasse (2001) found that users’ perceptions and values differ from the legal perspective 
in that: 
1.  People do not classify data as ‘private’ or ‘not private’ – rather, they rate the sensitivity of their 
information on a continuum. 
2.  The sensitivity of a particular data item will vary over time and in response to events. 
3.  The sensitivity of a particular data item will vary depending on who is using the information that 
can be derived from the data, and for what purpose. 
4.  Users are less concerned about securing access to data, and more concerned about protecting 
themselves from the adverse effects that may result from having the information that can be 
derived from the data used against them.
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5.  Data do not have to identify an individual to be perceived as private: individuals regard some 
usage of information about a family unit, a geographic area, or demographic, racial, social or 
interest group as an invasion of privacy. 
 
Essentially, most peoples’ attitude to privacy is pragmatic rather than dogmatic. Rather than 
treating privacy as an absolute value to be protected, people weigh the risks to their privacy (see 
point 4 above) against potential benefits that might be derived by providing the data. For instance, 
in the presence of a perceived safety need (for themselves or significant others), privacy usually 
becomes a secondary concern. People’s decisions to disclose information are mediated by the 
degree of trust they have in the receiver of the data. 
However, this ‘pragmatic’ attitude should not be confused with privacy not being important. Firstly, 
the ability to disclose information selectively, depending on perceived risks and benefits and the 
degree of trust in the receiver, is key to users ‘feeling in control’ in cyberspace. Secondly, there are 
many legitimate and beneficial interactions (such as self-help groups, role-playing and games), 
where anonymity or the ability to adopt multiple personae is seen as essential or important. 
3 CONCLUSION 
This paper has revealed the range of usability issues that current security mechanisms raise. It has 
also shown that usable security is not simply an issue of ‘fixing’ user interfaces to current 
mechanisms; rather, a change in how individuals, organizations and governments think about 
security is required. Usable security means appropriate security, and effective security is an 
integral part of the socio-technical system it is supposed to protect. Effective security has to take 
into account the needs of all stakeholders, acknowledge that their needs sometimes conflict and 
find a solution that is acceptable for all stakeholders in ongoing use. 
The review has highlighted issues affecting individual users and organizations. There are other 
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discussed. System developers and system administrators are critical of effective security, but 
currently often make mistakes because of the number and complexity of security issues they have 
to consider (Zurko and Simon 1996; Flechais et al. 2003). The needs of administrators could be 
addressed by reducing the amount and complexity of data they have to contend with. Machine 
learning and agent technologies could be used to summarize and filter information, and data 
visualization can be employed to help them interpret data and identify critical events. 
To address the problems of developers, security needs to be integrated into current development 
approaches (for example, it should be part of the software engineering documentation developers 
work with, rather than in a separate document). Design decisions must consider the mental and 
physical workload mechanisms impose on system administrators as well as end users, and provide 
them with tools that support their decision-making. The safety community has devised methods for 
developing systems that do exactly that, and security developers could harness and adapt their 
approaches. 
While the review emphasizes the urgent need to put users’ needs and values at the centre of 
security design, one caveat must be added: most users are not knowledgeable about security, nor 
do they want to be. Motivational approaches can be employed to change underlying perceptions 
about security and a limited set of key behaviours, but they will not motivate the majority of users to 
become security experts. Most users’ perceptions of security threats and risks to their assets are 
highly inaccurate and input from security experts is required to make sure they protect their assets 
effectively. Security experts, in turn, need to be prepared to design security that is appropriate for, 
and can work in, a particular social and organizational context, and incorporate basic ergonomic 
and economic principles in their considerations. 
Only systems that support the exchange of reliable trust cues – and thus allow for correct trust 
attribution – will be viable in the long run. If users find that they cannot rely on their trust 
perceptions when ordering goods or taking advice via videoconferencing, trust in the technologies 
and application domains may be lost, or result in a system burdened with costly regulation and 
control structures. What is sometimes described as a ‘lack of trust’ in e-commerce or free-riding in 
peer-to-peer systems is not an unavoidable consequence of technology-mediated exchanges; 
rather, it is a symptom of difficulties in adapting traditional ways of trustworthiness signalling and 
trust formation to new structural conditions. This should, however, not be interpreted as ‘in time, 
the trust problem will disappear because people will learn’ – negative trust experiences can cause 
long-term damage to the technologies and/or application domains involved. The damage will not 
only be to commercial companies – technology providers and organizations offering innovative 
services – but may also deprive individuals and society of the benefits the technology or service 
could offer. Such developments would disenfranchise those who can least afford to take financial 
risk, and/or lack in-depth knowledge and technical savvy to distinguish trustworthy actors from 
untrustworthy ones. 
Safeguarding privacy is a key concern for many users in cyberspace. On the one hand, security 
mechanisms can be essential tools for protecting privacy, for example, because they prevent 
unauthorized access to data. On the other, a security technology can enable invasions of privacy, 
for example, because it becomes possible to monitor an individual’s behaviour closely, or track her 
movements. Biometric technologies, seen by many governments and some security experts as the 
solution to providing ‘strong’ authentication, raise particular concerns in this respect. To make 
biometric applications acceptable, these applications will need to address a perceived security 
need, or offer other tangible benefits to users. 
NOTES 
1  In a cracking attack, the attacker downloads the encrypted password file and tries all possible ‘key combinations’ to 
reveal the password. Such ‘brute force’ attacks take a lot of computing power, or a very long time. Attackers can 
improve their chances by trying more ‘likely’ combinations (such as common words) first. Many users do not 
understand how cracking works, and assume passwords are ‘cracked’ by an individual trying to ‘guess’ their 
password (Adams and Sasse 1999). 
2  The reasons for lack of compliance are discussed later. 
3  Human memory performance for human faces is even better than for other images. 
4  An additional issue is that, since credential recovery occurs infrequently, the clues used would have to be extremely 
memorable and, at the same time, what Zviran and Haga (1990) call spouse-proof, i.e. not guessable by someone 
who knows the user well. 
5  Even though writing down passwords is forbidden in most security policies, the security research community is 
divided on this issue. Schneier (2000) endorses ‘secure writing down’ (in his case, in a file protected with a long 
passphrase) as the only way of managing a plethora of passwords, and makes fun of the ‘kneejerk’ reaction that Usability and trust in information systems        Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention Project 
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traditional security has against it. However, writing the password down violates the cardinal assumption of 
knowledge-based authentication (that the password should never be externalized in plain text). There are plenty of 
anecdotal reports and observations that users do externalize passwords and PINs for their own benefit in a way that 
significantly assists attackers (see section on PINs ). Also, since writing down is a form of disclosure, permitting 
some form of disclosure whilst punishing others makes it harder for users to distinguish between bad and good 
security behaviour. 
6  This issues also reiterates the need for spouse-proof authentication, see fn. 4. 
7  The use of credentials which are not secrets is becoming increasingly untenable in cyber-society. Users with some 
technical savvy recognize that such credentials could be used for identity theft, and use fake answers in an attempt 
to protect themselves. Unless this is done with careful planning (and possibly writing the credentials down); 
however, fake credentials are extremely vulnerable to being forgotten. 
8  Based on statistics compiled by researchers at the University of Bologna accompanying the trial. 
9  A key usability principle championed, amongst others, by the EU’s Information Society Technologies (IST) 
programme. 
10  Because some people do not have hands, or because their fingerprints are genetically indistinct or have been worn 
down by manual labour or exposure to chemical (The Economist  2003). 
11  Most users are more likely to blame themselves for failure to memorize a PIN, whereas failure to authenticate on a 
biometric system is perceived as a failing of the technology. 
12  A caveat that has to be added here is that the users were Nationwide employees, and the machines were situated 
indoors. 
13  Fingerprinting usually matches ‘found’ fingerprints against scanned full images of rolled fingerprints (usually taken of 
all 10 fingers, with expert handlers checking the prints on registration, and no time limits during registration or 
retrieval), as opposed to matching a template of a partial fingerprint against a registered template. A key usability 
issue is that the right part of the user has to present the same part of the registered finger that matches the stored 
template and that many authentication systems have to work very fast to be effective.  
14  Trust is a particularly interesting and relevant example of such a social norm. A user may not want to upset a 
colleague by locking their screen when they leave the office, because this may be interpreted as a lack of trust. 
Mitnick (2002) points out that social engineering attacks often exploit the users’ reluctance to declare or signal that 
they do not trust the attacker. 
15  In a context of high security awareness and shared security goals (for example, during the second world war), 
campaigns with simple reminders of how an individual’s behaviour puts them and others at risk may suffice. If 
people do not believe they are at risk, campaigns need to make the risks and consequences tangible – see, for 
instance, the current anti-smoking advertisements using real people, dying as a result of smoking, and other graphic 
imagery illustrating the consequences. Social marketing can have some effect, but changes in behaviour come 
about mostly when undesirable behaviour is confronted directly by other people.  
16  http://www.privacybird.com/ accessed 17 Apr. 04. 
17  These factors interact with each other, for example, a user’s previous experience can raise or lower her general 
propensity to trust. 
18  An example would be that an organization obtains data about a person from several sources by legal means, and 
then uses the information that can be derived from the data to classify the person without their knowledge. 
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